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A MARRIED WOMAN'S SURNAME:
IS CUSTOM LAW?
JULIA C. LAMBER*
A general awakening of concern for the rights of women has oc-
curred in recent years, and with it the particular problems of married
women have been analyzed against a background of centuries of legal
and social assumptions. With the impetus of employment discrimination
legislation, the proposed equal rights amendment,' and litigation rais-
ing sex discrimination issues, it is not surprising that many women
are actively seeking to retain their pre-marriage names. This move-
ment compels us to re-examine the custom that a woman must assume
her husband's surname upon marriage. That such a phenomenon is
custom and not law deserves our attention for several reasons. First,
a name is an obvious and significant symbol of a person's identity-a
woman's birth-given name is the name by which she is known and
with which her achievements are associated. Secondly, despite grow-
ing enlightenment about women and their roles in society, many judges
are making decisions based upon misreadings of the common law and
precedents in older cases, without proper examination of constitutional
and policy considerations. Thirdly, the proposition stated so posi-
tively in legal encyclopedias 2 that a woman upon marriage takes her
husband's surname actually reflects one more "unknowing" or "unin-
tended" discriminatory practice which perpetuates male dominance
solely by the fact of maleness. Arbitrariness is not a policy which
should be lightly pursued; we should at least expect that our laws are
reasonable and that our courts articulate and encourage reasonableness.
Therefore, although I first examine the history of surnames, the focus
of this Article is an inquiry into two questions which the courts must
resolve: First, under the common law can women retain their pre-
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University Graduate School of
Business. B.A., 1969, DePauw University; J.D., 1972, Indiana University.
1. H.R.J. Res. No. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See generally Note, Sex Dis-
crimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84
HAav. L. REv. 1499 (1971).
2. 57 AM. Jua. 2D Name § 9 (1971); 65 CJ.S. Names § 3c (1966); see Annot.,
35 A.L.R. 413 (1925).
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marriage names during marriage; and secondly, if not, is the imposi-
tion of the husband's name on his wife constitutional?3
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SURNAMES
People have not always had surnames; rather, they began to adopt
surnames through necessity. Since a name is an important source of
identification, it is not surprising that once the population of commun-
ities reached a certain level there developed a need to devise more dis-
tinguishable appellations and consequently names themselves became
longer.4 "Adam" and '"ve" sufficiently identify the seminal char-
acters of the Book of Genesis; one needs no further label. However,
once "John," "William," "Thomas," and "Peter" no longer sufficiently
identified people because of the sheer increases in population, second
names were added. 'William, son of Robert," became "William Rob-
3. In the past few years several commentators have discussed the subject of a
woman's right to retain or regain her pre-marriage name, making possible this over-
view approach and emphasis on constitutional arguments. See Brief for ACLU as Ami-
cus Curiae, Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223
(1972) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Brief]; Carlsson, Surnames of Married Women and
Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 552 (1971); Hughes, And Then There Were Two,
23 HsIasGs LJ. 233 (1971); MacDougall, Married Women's Common Law Right to
Their Own Surnames, WomEN's RTs. L. REP. 2 (Fall/Winter 1972-1973). See also
L. KANowrrz, WomasEN AND= LAW: ThE UFIMmsa.D REvOLUnoN 42-46 (1969);
Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberation: An Overview, 47 IND. LJ.
419, 430-33 (1972).
4. In Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. 566 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859), the court, before conclud-
ing that petitioner was free to continue to use an assumed name despite falling short
of a New York statute's requirement that legal name changes be granted only upon
a showing that the applicant will derive pecuniary benefit from the change, traced the
history of surnames. Surnames came into use in the fourteenth century an4 were not
of "controlling importance" as a means of identification until at least the time of Eliza-
beth L Id. at 568. During this period of growth in the use of a second name, the
choice of what name to adopt was individual, id. at 569; the Christian, or given, name
continued as the primary means of personal identification:
Greater importance being attached to the Christian name arose from the fact
that it was the designation conferred by the religious rite of baptism, while
the surname was frequently a chance appellation, assumed by the individual
himself, or given him by others, for some marked characteristic, such as his
mental, moral or bodily qualities, some peculiarity or defect, or for some act
he had done which attached to his descendants, while sometimes it did not.
Id. Only with the great increase in population over the centuries, necessitating a more
sophisticated distinction, and the requirement (from the time of Henry VIII) of record-
ing full names at birth, marriage, and death, did the custom of adopting parents' sur-
names become widespread. Nonetheless, "all this . . . was brought about without any
positive provision of law," id. at 571, and, consequently, "there is nothing in the law
prohibiting a man from taking another name if he chooses." Id. at 572.
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ertson;" "John the cook" became "John Cook;" and "Thomas" came to
be called "Thomas HalF' because he lived in or near a manor house.
At first these names were merely descriptive; they were changed to
reflect the owner's new position, or replaced by a better descriptive
label, or changed with each generation. It was only when surnames
ceased to literally describe some characteristic of the bearer that they
developed into hereditary family names.5
Since surnames were basically descriptive or occupational,6 it fol-
lowed that women took their husbands' surnames as their own. Most
women did not pursue occupations outside the home and inheritance
typically passed through sons or other male heirs. And there was the
common law fiction that the husband and wife were "one"-that "one"
being the husband.7 Thus the names that best described and identified
women to local officials were their husbands'. However, since the pro-
cedure for obtaining a surname was informal and flexible, it was a
common practice for children to be designated by their mother's name
if she were prominent. Also, if an inheritance was through the wife's
family, the husband might well adopt his wife's name as his surname.8
The common law fiction that husband and wife were "one" is
5. E. SMITH, THE STORY OF OuR NAmEs 39 (1970). See also W. BOWMAN, THE
STORY OF SuRNAMEs (1973); C. EWEN, A HISTORY OF SURNAMES OF T=E BRITISH ISLES
(1931).
6. E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 44. The author suggests two additional categories,
local and patronymical, to complete his four classes of surnames. Id.
7. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 189 (B. Gavit ed. 1941):
By marriage, the husband and the wife are one person in law, that is, the le-
gal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incor-
porated into that of the husband, under whose protection, and cover, she per-
forms everything, and is therefore called by French law, a feme covert, or un-
der the protection of the husband, her baron or lord, and her condition during
marriage is one of coverture.
Cf. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 403 (1895).
8. MacDougall, supra note 3, at 6 n.18. See also L. PINE, THE STORY OF SuR-
NAMES 23-24 (1966):
With regard to the surnames of married women, the usual course has been
and is to take the husband's name. There is no compulsion in the matter, and
there have been occasional instances of a woman retaining her own maiden
surname after marriage. There are more numerous examples of a man taking
his wife's surname. This is not always due to excessive feminism on the
wife's part, but to a variation of the old names and arms clause, by which the
husband of an heiress may well be required to assume her name. The idea
here is to give continuity to the ownership of the property and to preserve an
historic name. Many are the instances hidden under the thick branches of a
family tree, in which a man's name has been sacrificed in order that the family
themselves, and future ages also, may be deluded into assuming that the male
line identity has been kept up from a remote period.
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probably most responsible for the law-like custom that a married wo-
man's surname is her husband's. The fiction encouraged a man to treat
his wife as chattel, with no rights of her own and not legally competent
to act for herself. Thus, following the fiction to a logical conclusion,
the husband would "name" his wife as he might slaves or pets. Such
an uncompromising use of the common law is unfortunate as well as un-
deserved. According to Pollock and Maitland, the marital relation-
ship, particularly within the sphere of property law, cannot be explained
as being simply a subjection of the wife to the husband's will. Rather,
the woman continued to own property after marriage but the husband
acted as her guardian and the manager of the property. He needed her
concurrence to alienate more than a life estate, and the law assured her
the opportunity to freely refuse her assent to his acts." Yet the view
that a woman's rights were somehow merged into the husband's
through the marriage relationship served to support the practice of sus-
pending the woman's surname in favor of her husband's.10
Finally, even if we accept as rational the tradition of married
women taking their husbands' surnames-for example, as a means of
simplifying identification-it should be noted that the common law
also recognizes an informal means for changing names."1 By mere
use, a person can adopt a new legal name for any non-fraudulent rea-
son.12 Ironically, it is actually this common law change-of-name proc-
ess that enables a married woman to assume her husband's surname
as her own without formal court proceedings.1 3
9. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAnLAND, supra note 7, at 403-08.
10. See Converse v. Converse, 9 Rich. Eq. 535, 570 (S.C. Ct. Err. 1856): "[In
general, wives have surnames by courtesy only, adopted from their husbands, and it
is inconvenient that they should have appellations different from husbands." The
lower court refused to grant a wife a change of surname, requested with other equitable
relief in an action of partition against the husband, on the grounds that the requested
change was without precedent and that it would constitute an additional impediment
to the possible reconciliation of the couple. Id. at 539-40. Of course, had the husband
been granted a change of name, "that of the wife would also be changed, as a necessary
consequence," id. at 539, thus avoiding the problem of estranging the couple by per-
mitting them to use different surnames.
11. See Everett v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 332, 187 P. 996 (1919);
Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940); The King v. Inhabitants of Bil-
lingshurst, 105 Eng. Rep. 603 (K.B. 1814).
12. See, e.g., 23 HALsBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND 810, 812 (1936).
13. See Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 194 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910); M.
TuRNm-SAMOms, THE LAw oF MArU~D WOMEN 345-46 (1957); MacDougall, supra
note 3, at 4.
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From this examination of the history of surnames it should be
apparent that there is nothing in our English heritage requiring mar-
ried women to assume their husbands' surnames. Rather, choice,
convenience, and devotion to a fiction 14 gave us this custom. Indeed,
"in England, custom has long since ordained that a married woman
takes her husband's name. This practice is not invariable; nor com-
pelled by law."'15 What happened, then, to the common law in the
hands of American courts?
II. CASE LAW
In the tradition of avoiding constitutional questions, if possible,
in the resolution of disputes, I will look first at the case law to determine
if the common law allows married women to retain their birth-given
names. It is my contention that the answer is an emphatic "yes."
Some writers who have examined the subject of women's rights dis-
agree;' 6 their disagreement, however, can be traced primarily to a de-
sire to emphasize the plight of women at the hands of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory laws and to a misreading of the relevant cases. In fact,
the misreading of precedent has caused the statement "a woman
upon marriage takes her husband's surname' to be transformed from
an assertion of fact and custom into one of law and compulsion.
It should be clearly stated at the outset that there are only three
cases, People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky,' 7 State ex rel. Krupa v. Green,'"
and Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,'9 on the precise issue
of whether the common law operates to change a woman's name. The
other cases relied upon by the commentators are clearly distinguishable.
In fact, most of the cases which have raised the question of a married
woman's surname have done so only tangentially. Typically, the ques-
14. It should be noted that even if the concept that husband and wife were one
person in law is accepted as an accurate statement of the common law, the Married
Women's Property Act of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have effec-
tively negated this concept. See, e.g., Ch. 63, [1923] Ind. Acts 190, as amended,
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 38-101 to -122 (1949, Supp. 1972).
15. M. TuRNER-SAmunms, supra note 13, at 345 (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., L. KANowrrz, supra note 3, at 42-46; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freed-
man, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 940-41 (1971); Hughes, supra note 3, at 233-39. Contra,
Carlsson, supra note 3; MacDougall, supra note 3.
17. 327 Il. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
18. 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961).
19. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
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tion before a court is whether a married woman has been properly noti-
fied of litigation pending against her. For example, a Texas case,
Freeman v. Hawkins,"0 is often cited as establishing the principle that
a woman's name upon marriage is that of her husband.21  The con-
trolling issue in Freeman was whether a prior default judgment, follow-
ing service by publication issued against a woman in her maiden name,
was admissible against her in a trial involving the same property. The
court held that personal jurisdiction had not been obtained in the prior
judgment because the woman, known at the time of publication by her
married name, was not a "party" in a lawsuit designating her by her
maiden name only. Since the prior judgment was not binding on her,
evidence of it should not have been admitted by the trial judge.22 Un-
fortunately, some readers of Freeman have focused on the court's gra-
tuitous observation that, upon a woman's marriage, "the law con-
fer[s] on her the surname of her husband, ' 28 instead of the substance
of the decision: To provide legally adequate notice to a female defend-
ant by publication, her name must appear as the one she actually uses.
The source of that name is immaterial; the case would presumably be
applicable if service were attempted on a male by a name which he
has abandoned. 24
20. 77 Tex. 498, 14 S.W. 364 (1890).
21. E.g., Kidd v. Rasmus, 285 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Cloud v. McK'y,
216 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Freeman v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 289, 58 S.W.
2d 835 (1933); Stevens v. Stevens, 18 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Fields v.
Rust, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 350, 82 S.W. 331 (1904).
22. 77 Tex. at 500, 14 S.W. at 365.
23. Id.
24. Two Ohio cases are in accord with Freeman, although the decisions were
based on an interpretation of a statute requiring personal service when the defendant's
name is "unknown." Uthlein v. Gladieux, 74 Ohio St. 232, 78 N.E. 363 (1906);
Claxton v. Simons, 177 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio App. 1961). However, an appeal in Claxton
overruled this narrow reading of the statute, 174 Ohio St. 33, 189 N.E.2d 62 (1963).
In addition, the Ohio decision of State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497,
177 N.E.2d 616 (1961), leaves little doubt about Ohio's common law. See notes 58-
61 infra and accompanying text.
There are several other cases contrary to Freeman which enforced a prior judgment
issued in the maiden name of a married woman who used her husband's surname. In
most cases the distinguishing fact is that either the married woman actually received
notice or at least the other party did everything possible to provide notice. See Pooler
v. Hyne, 213 F. 154 (7th Cir. 1914); Emery v. Kipp, 154 Cal. 83, 97 P. 17 (1908);
Morris v. Tracy, 58 Kan. 137, 48 P. 571 (1897).
In related cases the principle is the opposite. Notice given in the name of the hus-
band is not sufficient in situations in which a married woman uses another name. See,
e.g., Kotechi v. Augusztiny, 87 Nev. 393, 487 P.2d 925 (1971) (notice to creditors
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/2
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A more recent Texas case weakened the "principle" for which
Freeman has been mistakenly cited. In Rice v. State 5 a conviction for
rape was dismissed for failure of the indictment to positively aver
that the victim was not the accused's wife.26  The state argued that
since the victim's surname was different from the accused's, the indict-
ment implicitly negated the possibility that she was his wife. How-
ever, the court pointed out that, although by custom women assume
their husbands' surnames, nothing in Texas law compels them to do
so. 2 7 Thus the court held that the indictment could not rely on an im-
plicit negation of marriage on the basis of custom, but must explicitly
negate all possible exceptions.
Another group of cases often cited as establishing the married-
woman-takes-husband's-name rule concerns the appropriate form of
name for a married woman, presently using her husband's name, who
is a candidate for public office. Huff v. State Election Board28 and
Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Committee 9 are illus-
trations of this problem with different but consistent results. In Huff
the wife wanted to use the name "Mrs. I. L. Huff" on the primary
ballot as a candidate for Oklahoma Commissioner of Charities and
Corrections. The state election board refused, contending that Ms.
Huff's legal name was her Christian name plus "Huff," the surname of
her husband, and not "Mrs." followed by her husband's initials and sur-
name. On writ of mandamus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned
that the purpose of the relevant statute 0 was to ensure that voters would
be informed of the identity of candidates, and that this purpose was
best served by candidates running under the names by which they are
commonly known. Since "Mrs. I. L. Huff" best identified the candi-
date, she was permitted to so designate herself on the ballot."
must be in the decedent's maiden name to properly identify her since she bad used
her maiden name in dealings with them).
25. 37 Tex. Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897).
26. The court ruled that all essentials of the statutory crime must be alleged in
the indictment and all exceptions in the statute must be negated. The statute defined
rape as "the carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 15 years, other than the
wife of the person. . . ." Id. at 37, 38 S.W. at 801.
27. Id. at 38, 38 S.W. at 802.
28. 168 Okla. 277, 32 P.2d 920 (1934).
29. 245 La. 145, 157 So. 2d 718 (1963).
30. Ch. 62, § 1, [1933] Okla. Laws 114.
31. 168 Okla. at 280, 32 P.2d at 922: "[It is not so much a question as to the
true legal name of the candidate as it is that the voter may be informed as to the
candidates by the names by which they are commonly known and called and transact
785
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Wilty, a Louisiana case, reached the opposite result, but for reasons
consistent with the principle in Huff. Ms. Laura Wilty wanted to use
the name "Mrs. Vernon I. Wilty, Jr." on the primary ballot in her cam-
paign for parish assessor. Her husband, Vernon J. Wilty, also a can-
didate, filed an objection to her candidacy under this name, based on
the potential confusion to voters. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that while "Mrs. Vernon . Wilty, Jr." was the name by which the
wife was commonly known, fairness to the other candidate and the
voters required that she be identified on the ballot as "Mrs. Laura Ver-
ret Wilty."32  The court found that, although "there is no definite law
or decision in Louisiana as to what is the legal name of a married wo-
man," the rule in other jurisdictions that women's names upon marriage
were changed to those of their husbands, as a matter of law, was
sound. 3  This conclusion is dictum; the question was whether the wife
their important private or official business." Accord, Roberts v. Grayson, 233 Ala.
658, 173 So. 38 (1937).
32. At issue in both cases was whether "Mrs." was part of the candidate's name.
Most authorities agree that it is merely a title, not part of a legal name, but may be
used to more completely identify the candidate. See Branch v. Bekins Van & Storage
Co., 106 Cal. App. 623, 290 P. 146 (1930); City of Camilla v. May, 70 Ga. App. 136,
27 S.E.2d 777 (1943); Feldman v. Silva, 54 R.L 202, 171 A. 922 (1934); cf. Brown
v. Reinke, 159 Minn. 458, 199 N.W. 235 (1924).
It should be emphasized that both women wanted to use the title "Mrs." as well
as their husbands' names. To fully understand Wilty, it should be noted that the Wil-
tys were legally separated at the time of the election filing.
33. In Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931), the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that a mother's signature in her maiden name preceded by the title
"Miss" on a marriage license for her second marriage was not conclusive in determining
the legitimacy of her son by an alleged first marriage: 'The fact that the license was
issued for the [second] marriage . . .in the maiden name of the testatrix is not at
all strange, for, in law, she still retained her maiden name, and bore [her first hus-
band's] name, if married to him, as a matter of custom." Id. at 415, 134 So. at 378.
Most authorities have read this case as evidence that Louisiana follows a civil law tra-
dition of French origin, under which a married woman continues to bear her birth-
given name in law. E.g., McMahon, Local Government Law, 25 IA. L. REv. 415
(1963):
Under French civil law, a woman retains her patronymic name throughout her
life, and regardless of marriage. Hence, there is no necessity for judicial au-
thority to resume the use of her maiden name after a divorce. Socially, the
wife in France uses the name of her husband; but no legal effect flows from
this social usage, as she must continue the use of her patronymic name in le-
gal and judicial acts....
By universal custom, the French practice was followed in Louisiana for more
than a century, and it continues to be followed today in New Orleans and
considerable portions of South Louisiana.
Hence, a concurring opinion in Wilty took issue with the majority's belief that Louis-
iana law was indefinite. 245 La. at 171, 157 So. 2d at 727 (Sanders, J., concurring).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/2
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might identify herself in the socially acceptable mode of "Mrs." fol-
lowed by her husband's name. The court held that this social prac-
tice should give way to the important public policy of ensuring the fair-
ness of elections, and forced the wife to use her own Christian names.34
Thus, neither Huff nor Wilty determines the form which a wo-
man's name must take upon marriage. Instead, they both conclude
that in order to prevent potential confusion to voters as to the identity
of candidates, a woman's name should appear in a designated form.
Yet both courts helped to reinforce the transformation of a custom into
"law" by their use of unnecessary language.
A third set of cases raises the question of the proper name of a
married woman for the purposes of motor vehicle registration. In
Bacon v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. 35 a husband and wife were in-
jured when an electric car was negligently driven into the automobile
they occupied. Although the evidence indicated that the wife, who
operated the car, exercised due care, the couple was precluded from re-
covering from the owner of the electric car, by the following logic:
the automobile, owned by the wife, was registered in her maiden name
although she had purchased it after her marriage; the wife was com-
monly known by, and otherwise identified herself by, her husband's
surname; "as a matter of law"3 her name upon marriage became that
of her husband; therefore, the vehicle was illegally registered under a
false name, 37 thus constituting a nuisance; because the wife was operat-
ing a nuisance, she was denied recovery; and because the husband had
reason to know the registration was improper, he was denied recov-
ery. 38
Three years later the Massachusetts Supreme Court refined its
position on the requisite form for motor vehicle registration. In Koley
34. 245 La. at 171, 157 So. 2d at 727.
35. 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926).
36. Id. at 32, 152 N.E. at 36, citing Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y.
437 (1881), see notes 42-46 infra and accompanying text, and MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
208, § 23 (1954): "The court granting a divorce to a woman may allow her to resume
her maiden name or that of a former husband."
37. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 2, 9 (1954), as amended, (Supp. 1973). At the
time of the action, Massachusetts' doctrine was that an illegally registered car was a
nuisance and a trespasser on the highway. The doctrine was statutorily withdrawn
in 1967; now illegal registration is evidence of negligence.
There is no indication in the opinion as to the reason for registering the car in the
wife's pre-marriage name since it was purchased after her marriage and change of
name.
38. 256 Mass. at 32, 152 N.E. at 36.
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v. Williams"0 a passenger in a taxicab was injured when the taxicab
collided with another vehicle. Apparently because the other driver
was not negligent, the injured party attempted to recover on the theory
that the owner of the second car had improperly registered it in the
name of "Mrs. John P. Williams," instead of her "legal" name, Ethel
M. Williams. In denying recovery, the court held that a wife's regis-
tration in her'husband's name is not illegal, particularly when the hus-
band is prominent in public life and the wife is commonly known by
reference to his name. The situation is different from Bacon, in
which the wife was known by a name other than that which she used
for registration. In short, the two cases, like the election cases, permit
a wife to use a name which reasonably identifies her in order to comply
with statutes whose purpose is identification. But again, the Koley court
prefaced its discussion of statutory purpose with the unnecessary ob-
servation that "as a matter of law the legal name of the [wife] upon
her marriage was Ethel M. Williams. The wife takes the husband's
surname."4  All that was required was a sensible application of the
Massachusetts nuisance rule to resolve the problem created by a mar-
ried woman's use of her husband's full name preceded by the title
In determining whether a married woman can, if she desires, re-
tain her pre-marriage name, it is necessary first to distinguish between
the situation in which the woman uses the surname of her husband-
and thus has changed her name-and that in which the woman retains
her birth-given name. Obviously, we should disregard those cases in
which a woman has adopted her husband's surname, for they do not
tell us whether the common law compels such a change. Therefore,
none of the cases discussed above is relevant in determining whether
the common law mandates a change of name upon marriage. Rather,
each is illustrative of judicial approval of a common law change of
name, from the pre-marriage name to the husband's surname, and each
39. 265 Mass. 601, 164 N.E. 444 (1929).
40. Id. at 602, 164 N.E. at 444, citing Bacon.
41. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
Custom has also declared that although "Ethel M. Williams" is the legal name of
the woman, a proper social appellation is "Mrs. John P. Williams." Custom carries
the distinction further, so that "Mrs. Ethel M. Williams" indicates a divorce while
"Mrs. John P. Williams" will continue to identify a married woman when she becomes
a widow, although these uses are not without ambiguity. See Carlton v. Phelan, 100
Fla. 1164, 131 So. 117 (1930).
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either assumes, or purports to decide, that this change is compelled
by established principles of common law. The cases are also examples
of judicial overstatement; each statement of dictum is relied upon in
further dictum to give a custom the apparent weight of prior judicial
determination.
The situation is complicated when it is unclear from the court's
opinion whether the woman has changed her name upon marriage.
A group of New York cases is illustrative. In Chapman v. Phoenix
National Bank of the City of New York,4 " Verina S. Moore, an unmar-
ried resident of North Carolina, purchased 150 shares of stock in a New
York bank in her maiden name in 1854. In 1859 she sold 66 shares
and took a new certificate for the retained shares, again in her maiden
name. In 1861 she was married to Reverend Dr. Chapman, and ap-
parently adopted his surname. In 1864 her shares were seized in New
York under a federal statute 4 authorizing confiscation of property of
persons aiding the insurrection of the South. The ensuing judicial pro-
ceeding in New York federal court was instituted against "Ver. S.
Moore;" service of process was attempted by local publication only.
Following a default judgment, Ms. Moore brought an action to recover
the dividends declared by the bank on the retained 84 shares. The
court held that the prior judgment was not conclusive of her rights,
because (1) the designation "Ver. S. Moore" did not sufficiently iden-
tify Ms. Moore; 44 (2) notice was published only locally in New York,
from which it could not be expected to reach Ms. Moore in North Car-
olina, particularly during the Civil War; and (3) the 84 shares of stock
were not identified so as to be conclusively recognized as those of Ms.
Moore.4 5 In short, Chapman was a Freeman-type notice case, and
did not require a determination of the legal form of Ms. Moore's
post-marriage surname. Unfortunately-and unnecessarily-the court
made a pronouncement which for nearly a century in New York has
buttressed the principle that women take their husbands' surnames:
For several centuries by the common law among all English speaking
people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her husband's surname.
That name becomes her legal name, and she ceases to be known by
42. 85 N.Y. 437 (1881).
43. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319.
44. 85 N.Y. at 449: "Who was Ver. S. Moore? If 'Ver.' is to be held not to be
a name but an abbreviation of some name, of what name? Is it the abbreviation of
Verplank, Vergil, Verrius, Verginius or of other names which could be mentioned?"
45. Id.
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her maiden name. By that name she must sue and be sued, make and
take grants and execute all legal documents. Her maiden surname is
absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known thereby.46
In Baumann v. Baumann4 7 a woman attempted to prevent her hus-
band's paramour 48 from using his surname. Reversing the trial court,
the New York Court of Appeals decided that there was no authority
for an injunction against adoption of a name under these circumstances
so long as its use by someone other than the legal wife did not affect
the matrimonial status of the wife-for example, by impersonation. 49
The court's rationale was that a wife has a "legal," but not "exclu-
sive," right to use her husband's name.r°
In In re Kayalof 5' a married woman sought to have her naturali-
zation certificate issued in her maiden name. She argued that she was
a professional musician, known commonly by her maiden name, and
therefore might suffer a financial loss by being registered in another
name. The court cited Chapman and Baumann as authority for the
principle that a woman's legal name following marriage is that of her
46. Id. The court cited no authority.
47. 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929).
48. The husband had attempted a Mexican divorce, but his subsequent marriage
to the paramour was declared void since the divorce was not valid. Id. at 385, 165
N.E. at 820.
49. Id. at 385, 165 N.E. at 819.
A vigorous dissent objected on the ground that the paramour's behavior did amount
to "impersonation;" in addition, the dissent argued that use of the Baumann name by
some other woman did in fact injure the wife and deprive her of a special, desired
status:
It is more than a name; it is a position, a status, a condition, a relationship,
a capacity. A name may mean very little, but the status and relationship
which it indicates may mean a great deal, not only to the parties, but to the
world. It means so much that a very large number of our citizens are op-
posed to the severence of the marriage tie for any reason.
Id. at 391, 165 N.E. at 822 (dissenting opinion). Compare Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lane,
246 Md. 55, 227 A.2d 231 (1967) (no fraud in woman using name of someone other
than her legal husband but answering that she was married), with Blanc v. Blanc, 21
Misc. 268, 47 N.Y.S. 694 (1897) (court acknowledged common law rule that wife
may adopt her husband's surname but held her in contempt for continuing to use it
after divorce because of her adultery). Blanc illustrates that a name may be important
enough that deprivation is considered an effective punishment.
50. 250 N.Y. at 387-88, 165 N.E. at 821.
Another dissent, echoing the ancient concept of the "merger" of husband and wife
in marriage, asserted that the wife has a property right to her name, analagous to the
"title of a civil or military office," which cannot be circumvented by the paramour's
common law right to assume a name. Id. at 388-89, 165 N.E. at 823.
51. 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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husband and denied relief, adding that women in public life are fre-
quently known by maiden or stage names, and that petitioner was not
seriously harmed by registering in her married name. Since it is un-
clear whether petitioner used her husband's surname socially or used
her maiden name exclusively, Kayaloff cannot be said to stand for the
principle of mandatory change of name. If, in fact, she used both
names, the principle is irrelevant; if she did not, the principle is the
basis for decision, but is based on a misreading of New York prece-
dent, since both Chapman and Baumann involved women who pre-
sumably changed their names.
There are, as noted above, three reported decisions in which the is-
sue of whether a name change is mandatory is determinative. In People
ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky52 a woman who had not changed her name upon
marriage sought, by writ of mandamus, to force the Chicago Board
of Election Commissioners to reinstate her registration to vote under
her maiden name. The woman was an attorney who used her maiden
name in all her business pursuits, and was admitted to the Illinois
Bar and had her law practice in that name. An Illinois statute required
that a "registered voter who changes his or her name by marriage or
otherwise, shall be required to register anew and authorize the cancel-
lation of the previous registration . . .. "53 Ms. Rago argued that
since she had not changed her name, the statute was inapplicable.
The Illinois Court of Appeals, however, construed the statute as re-
quiring a change of name upon marriage. Although it found no Illi-
nois authority in point, the court noted that courts in other jurisdic-
tions "have under varying facts and circumstances consistently held
that by custom and authority a woman, upon her marriage, takes her
husband's surname.' '1 4  Since nothing in the Illinois cases suggested
any "lack of adherence" to this principle, it followed that the legislature,
by "expressly recogniz[ing] a change of name by marriage," meant
to require such a change of name in voter registration."
The Lipsky opinion may be criticized on several grounds. First,
the authorities relied upon by the court as establishing the principle
that a woman must take her husband's surname upon marriage merely
52. 327 IM. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 6-54 (Smith-Hurd 1964). For the requirements in
other states. see Table in Appendix.
54. 327 Ill. App. at 69, 63 N.E.2d at 645.
55. Id.
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recognize or approve the common practice of changing names. Since
they do not hold such a change mandatory, the Lipsky court's
reliance on them is misplaced. Secondly, while the pertinent statute
reflects a presumption that married women do, in fact, change their
names-a presumption that was reasonable at the time of its origin-
the presumption is not irrebutable.5" It is more logical to read the stat-
ute as creating a procedure for easing the administrative problems
created by name changes by registered voters. If, for whatever rea-
son, a registrant's name is changed, the change should be reflected on
the registration rolls to prevent confusion or fraud. When a woman
continues to use her maiden name after marriage the purpose of the
statute is served by retention of that name in registration. Thirdly,
the court, by endorsing Ms. Rago's continued use of her maiden name
in her professional life, underscored the illogic of its holding. The
use of two names by married women professionals not only creates prob-
lems in their signing documents and performing other business acts,
but actually tends to encourage confusion or fraud.5r
In State ex rel. Krupa v. Green18 the Ohio Court of Appeals
reached a contrary result on facts very similar to those in Lipsky. A
taxpayer sought to prevent a county board of elections from placing a
woman's maiden name on a ballot for the office of municipal court
judge. The attempted disqualification was based on the fact that the
woman's voter registration had been cancelled under a procedure simi-
lar to Illinois'. 59  Unlike the Lipsky court, the Green court ruled that
since the candidate had not changed her name upon marriage, the stat-
ute did not apply.A0 Further, the court examined English authorities
56. See notes 62-67 infra and accompanying text. Since many states have regis-
tration statutes similar to Illinois', the issue of interpretation is crucial. See Table in
Appendix.
57. See text accompanying notes 82 & 83 infra. Requiring identification to be in
the husband's surname but allowing the wife to use and be known by any name she
chooses is impractical as well as undesirable, and raises constitutional questions.
58. 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961). See also State ex rel. Bucher
v. Brower, 21 Ohio Op. 208 (Montgomery County C.P. 1941); Lane v. Duchac, 73 Wis.
646, 41 N.W. 962 (1889).
59. Omo Rlv. CODE ANN. § 3503.18 (Page 1972).
A concurring judge questioned whether cancellation of voter registration, if proper,
would disqualify the woman as a candidate for public office since the requirements
for being a candidate provide that, in addition to certain legal qualifications, the per-
son must be a "qualified," but not necessarily a "registered," elector. There was no
question that the woman was legally qualified as an elector. 114 Ohio App. at 506,
177 N.E.2d at 620-21.
60. 114 Ohio App. at 502, 177 N.E.2d at 620. If the notice procedure is still
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on the relevant common law and concluded that name changes upon
marriage were merely a custom, not compulsory; since the woman was
free to use whatever name she chose, it followed that she should be per-
mitted to file for public office under any name by which she was
commonly known. Here, she had clearly demonstrated that she was best
identified by her maiden name, having arranged by antenuptial con-
tract with her husband to retain her maiden name, notified the election
board and obtained a notation on her registration card that she was
married but would retain her maiden name, voted consistently under
that name, and scrupulously used no other name in her public activi-
ties."1
The most recent of the cases in point is a Maryland case, Stuart
v. Board of Supervisors of Elections.62  A married woman who, pur-
suant to an oral antenuptial agreement with her husband,6 3 retained her
maiden name, sought to have her name reinstated on the voter registra-
tion roll following cancellation for failure to change the name to her
married name, pursuant to a statute similar to those of Illinois and
Ohio. The court construed the statute to require a change in registra-
tion only if the registrant in fact had changed his or her name, or was
compelled to by law.64 Since plaintiff clearly had not changed her name,
the court examined Maryland law to determine whether the change was
required. The court concluded that there were two lines of common
law authority, one requiring the change, the other not, and found Mary-
land to be within the latter:
followed in Ohio, some communication with the election board may be necessary. See
note 67 infra.
61. 114 Ohio App. at 501-02, 177 N.E.2d at 619.
The indicated steps are helpful, but all may not be essential in retaining one's birth-
given name. For example, an antenuptial contract may be evidence of intent, but so
is the continued, uninterrupted use of a birth-given name after marriage.
62. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972), noted in 32 MD. L. REV. 409 (1973).
63. It is questionable whether such an agreement was necessary to the outcome
of the case since it is not required for women in changing their names at marriage,
nor for men in retaining their names. An antenuptial agreement might be helpful to
future litigants, however.
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-18(c) (1957). Maryland's procedure provides for
notification by clerks of the circuit court to the Board of Supervisors of Elections of
the names of females over eighteen years of age, in order to facilitate cancellation of
registration in the former name and re-registration in the married name. The clerks
then notify the Board of all female residents over twenty-one years of age "whose
names have been changed by marriage . . . ." Id. § 3-18(a)(3). The Board then
notifies the registrant that she has two weeks "to show . . . why [her] registration
should not be cancelled." Id. § 3-18(c).
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. ..Maryland law manifestly permits a married woman to retain her
birth given name by the same procedure of consistent, non-fraudulent
use following her marriage. In so concluding, we note that there is
no statutory requirement ... that a married woman adopt her hus-
band's surname.tEO53 Consistent with the common law principle referred
to in the Maryland cases, we hold that a married woman's surname does
not become that of her husband where, as here, she evidences a clear
intent to consistently and non-fraudulently use her birth given name
subsequent to her marriage.66
In answer to the argument of potential confusion and fraud, the court
suggested the election board "make whatever cross-reference notation to
the fact of . . .marriage . . . that it thinks administratively feasible
to meet the avowed needs of voter identification and prevention of dual
registration.""7
In concluding this examination of the case law to determine
whether the common law allows a married woman the option of retain-
ing her birth-given name,"" it may not be incorrect to state that by
65. For a contrary situation, see HAwAu REv. STAT. § 574-1 (1968): "Every mar-
ried woman shall adopt her husband's name as a family name." Hawaii is the only
state with a statutory provision determinative of the issue, although Kentucky and pos-
sibly Minnesota have implied such a rule since their statutory change-of-name proce-
dures exclude married women. Ky. REv. STAT. § 401.010 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.10 (1971). See also Table in Appendix.
66. 266 Md. at 446-47, 295 A.2d at 226-27.
67. Id. at 450, 295 A.2d at 228.
Actually, because of notice given by court clerks to election boards, it is still neces-
sary for women to "show cause" why their registration should not be cancelled. Such
a burden, though, is satisfied by "production of adequate identification and other con-
vincing evidence that she is known and identified in the community by the name un-
der which she seeks to register." Letter from Maryland Attorney General to Willard
Morris, State Administrator of Election Laws, Nov. 30, 1972 (signed by E. Stephen
Derby, Assistant Maryland Attorney General).
It might well be a better procedure to have the presumption work in the opposite
way; that is, the "state will assume no change of name unless notified by the individ-
ual." See note 82 infra.
68. In order to determine the common law in states where there is neither statutory
pronouncement nor relevant case law, one must rely on other states' cases and decide
which the court would follow. Some indication of the public policy of the state may
be obtained by examining the statutes cited in the Table in Appendix.
It should also be noted that the controversy over names is not peculiar to the present
time. During the 1920's there was a strong movement to protect the right of married
women to retain their pre-marriage names. For a detailed discussion, see E. SMrrI,
supra note 5, at 250-51; MacDougall, supra note 3, at 5-7. In the nineteenth century,
suffragette Lucy Stone was perhaps the most famous married woman not to adopt her
husband's surname.
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operation of law, the wife takes the husband's surname. Such a
statement is more accurately merely recognition of a fact; most women
upon marriage take their husbands' surnames as their own, and the
law permits this change of name. But by misstating precedent and
overemphasizing the frequency with which the change occurs, many
courts and officials have transformed an option into a requirement.
Because the law in some jurisdictions is, or appears to be, supportive of
the principle of mandatory change, examination of the constitutional
implications of requiring a woman to change her name on marriage is
necessary.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In Forbush v. Wallace"9 the constitutionality of a mandatory
change of name by operation of common law was upheld by a three-
judge district court and affirmed without opinion by the Supreme
Court. A married woman brought a class action challenging the con-
stitutional validity of an unwritten regulation of the Alabama Depart-
ment of Public Safety that a married woman's driver's license must be
issued in her husband's surname. In order to induce the court to de-
cide whether the regulation violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 70 the woman conceded that Alabama's com-
mon law required a change of name upon marriage."1 After satisfying
itself that mandatory change is the Alabama rule, the district court
found a rational basis for the regulation and refused to enjoin the De-
partment from enforcing it. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court,
without hearing or briefs, affirmed per curiam.72  The importance of
Forbush rests on three determinations: (1) Does the common law of
Alabama require that a woman change her surname upon marriage?
(2) What is the significance of the Supreme Court's affirmance? and
Finally, we should remember that entertainment personalities traditionally do not
change their names upon marriage; for them to do so could be extremely burdensome.
69. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 405
U.S. 970 (1972).
70. See ACLU Brief 11.
71. For discussion of whether Alabama has a common law rule requiring married
women to change their names, see notes 73 & 74 infra and accompanying text.
72. 405 U.S. 970 (1972):
Unwritten regulation of Alabama Department of Public Safety requiring each
married female applicant to use husband's surname in seeking and obtain-
ing driver's license, and Alabama common law rule that husband's surname is
wife's legal name, does not violate Equal Protection Clause.
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(3) Was the three-judge panel's determination of the equal protection
question correct?
The district court in Forbush found, as plaintiff had alleged, that
Alabama common law did require a name change upon marriage.
Yet examination of the cases relied on demonstrates that in Alabama,
as elsewhere, there had been no case directly in point, but only dicta
reciting the aphorism that a name change is mandatory.
Had the Forbush court understood this, and made a comprehen-
sive examination of the conflicting decisions in other jurisdictions, it
might have advisedly deferred its judgment under the abstention doc-
trine.7 3  But plaintiff alleged a mandatory rule, and the case was de-
cided on the pleadings on a motion to dismiss; hence the question of
Alabama's actual common law rule is not foreclosed by Forbush.4
The importance of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
Forbush is open to question. Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is,
of course, automatic for cases in which a three-judge court has granted
or denied a request for a permanent injunction.75  Arguably, then,
the Court was faced with a seemingly unimportant question, was un-
willing or unable to hear arguments, yet was compelled by statute to
rule, since theoretically it does not have discretionary jurisdiction in
73. See Note, Equal Rights for Women: The Need for a National Policy, 46 IND.
L.L 373, 378 n.24 (1971).
74. It appears a wiser course of action for future litigants to challenge both the
common law "rule" and its constitutionality. Courts often are thereby encouraged to
resolve the less volatile common law issue favorably to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion. See, e.g., Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d
223 (1972).
Two issues tend to be confused in Forbush, and should be refined. First, Ms. For-
bush challenged the regulation that requires a married woman to obtain her driver's
license in her husband's name; and secondly, she challenged Alabama's "rule" which
requires a married woman to adopt her husband's surname as her own. If the latter
question is resolved as constitutional, the former is also easily designated as correct.
Surely the state has an interest in making certain that a person applies for and receives
a driver's license in only one name, and arguably this name is better if it is the appli-
cant's legal name. But it might well be argued successfully that the state's interest
is served by knowing any one name which identifies the citizen and that it makes no
difference whether this name is a "legal" one. A "legal" name could be the one which
identifies the citizen. To illustrate: what is the legal name of a man who alters his
birth-given name through the general common law change-of-name procedure? Thus
the key issue is whether the second "rule," Alabama's mandatory change-of-name rule,
is constitutional. However, the Forbush opinion does not make clear these distinctions
and tends to focus on the former question.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966); FED. R. Civ. P. 72.
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three-judge appeals. However, since the Court did not have briefs,
heard no oral arguments and wrote no opinion, its disposition of the
constitutional question is of doubtful precedential value.76 Further,
the constitutional question might be somewhat different when presented
in the context of a denial of voting rights, which have been accorded
"fundamental" or special status in previous equal protection cases. 7 7
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Frontiero v. Richard-
son78 appears to signal a new direction in sex discrimination cases.
In determining the constitutionality of both Alabama's common
law obligatory name change and its practice of requiring women to
obtain driver's licenses in their husbands' names, the Forbush court
employed the traditional "rational basis" test of equal protection."9
The court discussed three factors tending to support the rationality of
Alabama's practices: custom, uniformity, and administrative conven-
ience. Even assuming that the court was correct in premising that the
practices are permissible if it "can discern any rational basis" for them,
the factors relied upon are of questionable validity. First, "custom"
76. R. SrTEN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME CouRT PRAcncE 233 (4th ed. 1969);
ACLU Brief 11; Carrie, The Three Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. CI. L. REv. 1, 74 n.365 (1964); Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 14 (1930); Sedler, supra
note 3, at 448 n.167.
In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 616 n.35, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264 n.35 (1971),
the court stated:
Summary disposition of a case by the Supreme Court need not prevent the court
from later holding a full hear;ing on the same issue. The constitutionality of
compulsory school flag salutes is a case in point. For three successive years
-in Leoles v. Landers [302 U.S. 656 (1937)1; Hering v. State Board of
Education [303 U.S. 624 (1938)]; and Johnson v. Deerfield [306 U.S. 621
(1939)--the Supreme Court summarily upheld lower court decisions which
ruled such requirements constitutional. The very next year the high court
granted certiorari in Minersville District v. Gobitis [310 U.S. 586 (1940)],
thereby providing for oral argument and a full briefing of the issue. Although
in Gobitis it adhered to its earlier per curiam decisions, three years later the
court reversed its position and ruled such requirements invalid. (West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette [319 U.S. 624 (1943)]).
See also [1973] PA. A'rr'y GEN. Op. 62 (distinguishing Forbush).
77. The voting rights case is different since another, more rigorous standard of
review is used. See text accompanying notes 93-95 infra.
78. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
79. "Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be
sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental inteeest." Id. at 683, citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
546 (1972), Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971), Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), and
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
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is not necessarily a logical basis for any law since a custom may be
arbitrary and discriminatory."0 Although state regulations which re-
flect longstanding convention and practice may be less disruptive than
those which alter or expand them, mere longevity of an arbitrary or
discriminatory practice should not serve as justification in itself for its
continuation. An examination of the history of "custom" in race rela-
tions in the United States demonstrates the danger of rationalizing pres-
ent behavior in terms of historical practice. Moreover, a primary bene-
fit of the equal protection clause, under either the "rational basis" or
"suspect criteria" test, is that it serves to hinder the protraction of social
convention or "custom" by its own weight. To say that one group
must be subjected to different treatment from another because society
has so required for centuries nullifies equal protection.
The same analysis applies to "uniformity.""' While uniformity
of practice may give some indication of what is considered "fair" or
"rational," it cannot by itself support a classification. This is particu-
larly true in an area like women's rights, where "uniformity" may
signify no more than longstanding insensitivity or indifference. And,
as discussed above, uniformity on the question of mandatory change
of name does not exist anyway.
The administrative convenience rationale is more difficult.
Clearly, the state has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud in motor
vehicle registration and in administering its registration process as
efficiently as possible. The state has a valid interest in being able to
quickly and correctly identify people in numerous circumstances, for
example, in verifying various statutory qualifications, in auditing tax
returns, and in maintaining accurate voting records. And the state has
an, important interest under its police powers in preventing people
from fraudulently misrepresenting themselves. These articulated state
interests are not, however, served by requiring a married woman to
assume her husband's surname.8 2 For example, a married woman may
80. See ACLU Brief 12; E. SMrrH, supra note 5, at 124-64.
81. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
82. Actually, the state's interest in administrative convenience is one of presump-
tion, in that the state assumes a woman changes her name upon marriage and is there-
fore confused when she does not. A simple resolution of this confusion, however, is
that the state should assume that a person's name remains the same and, if there is
a change, the state will be notified. It should not be assumed the person changing
names forgot. If the state is not notified, then the burden and responsibility fall prop-
erly on the individual who failed to give notice.
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lawfully use a professional name as well as the required surname, making
communication with and identification of her more, rather than less,
difficult. The cases discussed earlier, in which notice was attempted in
married women's maiden names, only arose because the women had
changed their names upon marriage, making tracing and identification
more difficult.
To look at the same problem in a somewhat different way, con-
sider the state's argument if the rule were not in effect and a woman
had sought to require a change of name. The state could logically ar-
gue that to require women always to use their birth-given names, except
by judicial action, regardless of their matrimonial status, would be less
confusing and more likely to prevent fraud. Since the matrimonial
status of women is irrelevant for purposes of motor vehicle registration,
this would provide the easiest possible record-keeping for the state-
no one changes his or her name from the time of registration without
a court order. The substance of the administrative convenience argu-
ment, then, lies not in the inherent convenience or virtue of changing
names upon marriage, but in the temporary inconvenience of changing
from one system of registration to another, a basis that should never by
itself support an arbitrary classification. 3
A notation as to marital status and spouse's name, of course, would not aid in de-
tecting other frauds, for example, when a person has stolen other identification and
assumes a new identity.
83. Aiding a court in its analysis of the constitutional issue of what different treat-
ment of men and women is allowable are a number of recent cases. See, e.g., Bray
v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972); Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors, 309 F. Supp.
184 (E.D. Va. 1970); Mollere v. Southeastern La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D.
La. 1969); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
See also Johnson & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspec-
tive, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971).
In my discussion of how to satisfy an equal protection-rational basis test, I have
used the analysis of the Forbush court and presented an alternative measure of it. How-
ever, one might well argue that the entire analysis is out of focus and some key con-
siderations are omitted. For example, the rational basis test was originated to establish
whether there was a rational reason for treating people differently. That is, an equal
protection challenge in this case claims that it is unconstitutional to require married
women to change their names upon marriage but to make no such requirement of men.
However, if the interest to be served is a resulting "family" name, then it would
be ridiculous to require both men and women to change, for no common name would
result. But if continuation of the family name is a legitimate state interest, the auto-
matic choice of the man's is not likely to be upheld. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (Idaho's mandatory preference for men in estate administration appointments
held unconstitutional); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father suc-
cessfully challenged statute which allowed unwed mothers a hearing but none for un-
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The Forbush court balanced the interests of the state against those
of the class of women and found that administrative convenience and
the cost of change outweigh the harm to women in having to formally
change their names back to their maiden names following marriage.
The injury imposed by the classification was characterized as "de mini-
mus" since Alabama's change of name procedure is simple, auto-
matic, and costs only two dollars. In balancing, however, the court
should have looked at the state's true interest, which is knowing who a
registrant is. To serve this interest there are better, alternative proce-
dures available which could be implemented inexpensively and would
not deprive a married woman of the appellation of her choice.
This discussion of Forbush should demonstrate that the court's
analysis of the constitutional issue should not be accepted without fur-
ther reflection and refinement.84 Admittedly, the rational basis test is
not easy to apply, but too often in the past the tendency has been to up-
hold a regulation with almost any alleged, or even potential, state in-
terest, without examining whether the interest actually exists or is prop-
erly served by the regulation. Dissatisfied with the results of tradi-
tional equal protection analysis in some areas, the Supreme Court has
developed other standards of review. The standard of review feminists
have urged courts to adopt for sex discrimination cases is the "com-
pelling state interest" test. Under this test, if a regulation creates or
enforces a classification that is "suspect" or impinges on a "funda-
mental" right, it will not be upheld unless it can be justified by a
compelling state interest8 5 And in determining whether this higher
wed fathers before declaring their children wards of the state). Thus, administratively
convenient assumptions which discriminate have been recently held unconstitutional.
We might also question the legitimacy of a family name, for it does not seem to
be relevant to any valid governmental objective. That two people share the same
name could indicate that they are married, divorced, brother and sister, mother and
son, or cousins. One could have assumed the name of the other under the general
common law change of name or it could be a matter of chance. If the fact of mar-
riage is really what is important, factual notation on any records, easy in a computer
age, is preferable. This argument is really premised on due process, which limits the
government's right to act in areas which are beyond its legitimate interests. Such an
argument would follow the analysis suggested in the abortion decisions, Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the mandatory maternity
leave case, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974).
84. But cf. [1973] HAwAx Arr'y GEN. Op. LE=R (statute requiring name change
"unquestionably" valid).
85. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Flor-
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standard has been satisfied, courts subject the purported basis for the
classification to "strict scrutiny;" "potential" or "arguable" rationales
are not sufficient.
After continuous urging from courts, writers, and litigants, 6 a
plurality of four members of the Supreme Court declared in Frontiero
v. Richardson that "classifications based on sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrtiny. '87  In Fron-
tiero a married female Air Force officer successfully challenged a stat-
ute which declared that spouses of male members of the uniformed ser-
vices are "dependents" for purposes of obtaining increased housing and
medical allowances, but that spouses of female members are not "de-
pendents" unless they are, in fact, dependent for over one-half of their
support on the income of their wives. In urging the constitutionality
of the regulation, the Government relied on the administrative con-
venience argument; in essence the Government argued that because
wives in our society-particularly within the armed services-fre-
quently are economically dependent upon their husbands, while hus-
bands rarely are dependent upon their wives, a legitimate interest of
saving money is served by the absolute presumption in one case and
the need for proof in the other.88 In rejecting this reasoning as insuf-
ficient to uphold the statute, the Court was skeptical about the validity
of both the presumption of dependency, recognizing the higher earning
capacity of women today and the low salaries of most service person-
nel, 8  and of the cost argument, since the dependency determination
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
86. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Sail'er
Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Carlsson, supra note 3, at
561-62; Hughes, supra note 3, at 241-43; ACLU Brief 14-18. See also Brief for Appel-
lant at 8-24, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Brief for American Veterans Comm.
& NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund as Amici Curiae at 7-19, Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
87. 411 U.S. at 688.
88. Automatic qualification of wives as dependents, whether they are in fact, but
requirement of proof of actual dependency of husbands, is the general pattern in federal
and state employment benefits and social insurance legislation. See Holman & Bixby,
Women and Social Security, in LAw AND POLICY IN Fra' CouNms 73 (HEW Pub.
No. (SSA) 73-11800, 1973); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at app. E, Commissioner
v. Moritz, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973), cited
in Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.AJ. 1013, 1015 n.26
(1973).
89. 411 U.S. at 689-90 n.23.
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was made merely by written affidavits and not by full hearings. More-
over, the Court reasserted its belief that administrative convenience
should not be the determinative test in evaluating discriminatory classi-
fications. 90
If sex is now to be placed in the "inherently suspect" group, as
the Frontiero plurality suggests, the constitutionality of mandatory
name changes should be re-examined. Since only women must af-
firmatively undertake to change their names by judicial process in order
to retain their maiden names after marriage,91 in those states where
name changes are mandatory the law creates a classification based solely
on sex. When the only valid state interest served by the classification
is administrative convenience, and particularly when that interest can
easily be served in less onerous ways, the practice should not be up-
held.Z
There is another way in which women can invoke the compelling
state interest test in challenging mandatory change-of-name rules: that
is, if the challenged regulation deals with voting, which has been recog-
nized as a "fundamental" right. 3 For example, in Stuart it was argued
that the statutes requiring cancellation of voting registration interfered
with the right to vote and could not be sustained unless the state showed
that the regulation advanced a compelling state interest. 4  It appears
from the cases9" that once a court adopts this rigorous standard of
review, the regulation is not likely to stand.
If the lower federal courts decline to follow the Frontiero plurality
90. Id. at 690, quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972): "[O]ur prior
decisions make clear that although efficacious administration of governmental programs
is not without some importance, 'the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency."'
91. Mandatory change of name is surely discriminatory on the basis of sex since
it is the woman who is compelled to change her name. It does not matter that
only married women are so classified because the distinction is drawn between married
men and married women; thus the difference in treatment is based on sex. See' Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
92. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971); Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372, 1379 (9th Cir. 1971)
(dissent from denial of rehearing), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
93. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
94. 266 Md. at 449, 295 A.2d at 229. See ACLU Brief 14-18. The Stuart case-
note, supra note 62, at 423-26, analyzes the constitutional question in regard to this
fundamental right.
95. See cases cited notes 85-92 supra.
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and refuse to apply the compelling state interest test in sex classification
cases, there is another possible standard of review to consider. Many
courts have read Reed v. Reed,9" a sex classification case relied upon
by the Frontiero majority, as establishing a stricter standard of review
within the traditional "rational basis" test.9 7  For example, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Green v. Waterford Board of Education9"
viewed Reed as a refinement of the rational basis test. In Green a man-
datory maternity leave for school teachers not less than four months
prior to expected confinement was held unconstitutional. The first
question the court addressed was which standard of review to use.
Relying on Reed, the court adopted a more stringent rational basis test
which required that a "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation." '99 The court concluded
that the state's interests---continuity of classroom education, protec-
tion of pregnant women, prevention of classroom disruptions through
student reactions to pregnancy, and administrative convenience-were
not "suitably furthered" by the rigid maternity leave policy.
In challenging mandatory change of name, the "fair and sub-
stantial" test should be sufficient to declare the alleged common law
"rule" unconstitutional. The analysis required today of any court, even
under the "traditional" test of equal protection, is more than the mere
articulation of historical but irrelevant doctrines. The state interests
advanced to satisfy any standard of review will be the same and will be
subject to the same refutation.' 0
96. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also note 83 supra.
97. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (concurring opinion)
("abundantly support"); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 401-
02 (4th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion), rev'd sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); see Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 414 U.S. 907 (1973); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,
465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); Struck v. Secretary of
Defense, 460 F.2d 1372, 1378-80 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), vacated and re-
manded, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
98. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
99. Id. at 633, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The court also
cited Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), and Chicago Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), as supportive of this new standard of review.
100. The difference in standards of review is not one of substance but of presump-
tion. That is, under the traditional rational basis test a court presumes the statute
or regulation to be valid and the challenge must establish its arbitrariness. On the
other hand, under the strict scrutiny standard it appears that the regulation is presumed
invalid and the state has the burden of establishing its validity. Therefore, the refu-
803
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IV. OTHER STATE INTERESTS
My discussion of constitutional challenges to a mandatory change-
of-name rule has focused primarily on two state interests in perpetuat-
ing the rule: ease of administration and prevention of fraud. Although
these are the most often articulated interests, there are other possible
interests a court might be asked to protect. First, there is the interest
of creditors and other members of the public who rely on proper iden-
tification of the people with whom they do business. For example, most
limitations on a person's right to change his or her name, by common
law or by statutory procedure, are calculated to protect other people.
The identity of the owners of property should be available to creditors
to prevent fraud. To facilitate property changes, accurate record-
ing of the names of the owners is essential. There are situations in
which a woman who has changed her name upon marriage is obligated
to give notice of the name change. 10 ' Thus if a woman does not change
her name upon marriage, notice would be unnecessary. As long as
she continues to be known by the same name under which she does
business or holds property, nothing is gained by forcing her to as-
sume her husband's surname. 0 2
A second interest is raised by the problem of naming children.
Obviously, the issue of a child's name may never arise, since having
children is not the only reason people marry. Further, the marriage re-
lationship involved may well be one in which the couple, by mutual
agreement, can choose any appropriate name for their child. There are
generally no statutes dictating that married parents give a child the sur-
name of the father; although customarily parents do, they have a choice
tation of the state's interests provided in the Forbush discussion, see notes 79-83 supra,
is still applicable.
We should also note that if the proposed equal rights amendment is adopted by the
states, more impetus will be felt to disallow a mandatory change of name as well as
any presumptions of change of name by married women. Several writers have dis-
cussed the equal rights amendments effect. E.g., Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
supra note 16, at 940-41; Sedler, supra note 3, at 432 n.67.
101. For a more fully developed analysis of this notice problem, see Hughes, supra
note 3, at 341-43. Although I disagree with some of her conclusions, the discussion
raises some state interests which ultimately will be tested.
102. In the context of marital property being subject to creditors of one spouse, a
creditor may have a legitimate interest in knowing that a person is married. I have
chosen not to discuss in detail the consequences of this special property relationship
but, again, notation of marriage is a better means of giving a creditor notice than a
mandatory change of name.
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and can freely exercise it. Cases that have addressed the issue of a
child's surname typically involve a situation in which a divorced mother
has custody of the child, has remarried and changed her name, and wants
to change the child's name against the wishes of the father.10 3 In these
cases the courts, in denying the mother's request, have employed the
common law doctrine that a father has a "customary" right to have his
child bear his surname.10 4
Even though it is a custom in the United States to give a child
the father's surname, it is not the only possibility. Persons of Spanish an-
cestry often use both parents' surnames as the surname of the child.'
Couples can choose the mother's name as the more appropriate. Or
couples can choose an entirely different surname for their children,
just as they are free to choose the first and middle names. As with a
woman's marital status, any records which need to indicate the par-
ents' names could contain some notation or cross-reference system
identifying the child. Since there are several alternatives in naming
a child, this is really a "non-issue" as long as it is recognized that the
state's interest is in correctly identifying the child and nothing more.
A third problem is that the state may claim an interest in the pres-
ervation and stability of the family as a viable social unit; allowing
married women to keep their own names may aid in the destruction of
the family. Assuming that the state does have an interest in the fam-
ily, a "one name" rule will not help keep a family together if it is not
already stable and viable.10 6
Finally, it was argued in Forbush that allowing a married woman
to retain her maiden name was unnecessary since almost all states al-
low a married woman to change her name through a statutorily es-
tablished court procedure. This state interest is actually part of the ad-
ministrative convenience argument and is objectionable on grounds noted
above.10 7  A second objection is to the implicit assumption that a
103. See, e.g., Application of Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1968); Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio 1953).
104. The primary concern of the courts is the best interest of the child. If the
father is continuing to fulfill his parental responsibility, the courts usually decide a
change of name would injure the relationship between child and father. See Carlsson,
supra note 3, at 563-69; Hughes, supra note 3, at 243-47; 44 CORNELL L.Q. 144 (1958).
105. E. SMITh, supra note 5, at 134. See generally id. at 124-64.
106. See Brief for Petitioner at 14-16, In re MacDougall, Case No. 135463 (Dane
County, Wis. Cir. Ct. 1972).
107. See text accompanying notes 82 & 83 supra.
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change-of-name petition and procedure reflect. The principle to which
many women object is that the only way to retain their birth-given
names is to change them upon marriage and then spend additional
time and money to change them back. 0 8 Thirdly, such a rule would
raise serious constitutional questions since only women are required to
go through formal court procedures to retain their names. It is also argu-
ably unconstitutional to impose additional requirements for retaining
one's name, when the retention i§ already legal.109 Finally, many
judges construe statutory change-of-name procedures as granting them
broad discretion. 110 In states where the statutory procedure is non-
exclusive"' such a reading would have the incongruous result of dis-
couraging people from using the formal statutory procedure because
of fear of an adverse judicial decision.112 Actually, allowing a change
of name by court procedure refutes the argument that a state may have
an interest in compelling a woman to adopt her husband's surname,1 8
since the results of successful court action and retention of a birth-
given name are the same: a married woman with a name different
from her husband's.
Having articulated potential state interests in a mandatory change
of name, we should reflect again on the interest of a woman in keeping
108. See note 74 supra.
109. Restrictions on voting rights serve as a recent example. The Court, answering
the argument that taking children from their father without a hearing was defensible
because he might regain custody through adoption, stated in Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972): "This Court has not, however, embraced the general prop-
osition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."
110. See In re Hauptly, - Ind. App. -, 294 N.E.2d 833 (1973); cf. Application
of Douglas, 60 Misc. 2d 1057, 304 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1969); MacDougall, supra note 3,
at 13; WOMEN's RTS. L. RPTR. 26 (Spring 1972).
111. See Table in Appendix.
112. Since people may change their names informally by continuous use, most
change-of-name statutes are codifications of the common law. The primary value of
such statutes is for record-keeping. In states where the statutory procedures are not
exclusive, the common law has not been abrogated. State officials believe the statutory
method is preferable because it provides judicial notice and an official record. How-
ever, if judges deny change-of-name petitions to married women on the basis of judicial
discretion while married women and others are allowed to use the common law change
of name, there is no incentive, but actually dis-incentive, to go to court. Thus the
statutes would not serve their purpose. Therefore, a judge's discretion should be limited
to situations of fraud or injury to others-the same limits imposed on common law
changes of name.
113. Such an argument might be used in Hawaii which, while requiring a change
of name upon marriage, permits a married woman to change her name by court pro-
cedure. See note 115 infra.
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her name. A woman may not only have a sentimental or hereditary
attachment to her name, but presumably will expect society to associate
her name with her accomplishments and personality-in short, a wo-
man will regard her name as a primary symbol of her identity. Thus,
a woman who has lived for twenty-two years and has been married for
only two may justifiably consider her birth-given name as the best
means of identification. 114  To allow a state to take away a name a
woman wants to keep-her own source of identification to the
world-is not a "de minimis" injury. The woman's interests, coupled
with the fact that men and single women are relatively unrestrained in
choosing the names by which they are known, are sufficient to counter-
balance the state's interest in requiring women to change their names
upon marriage. The sex discrimination explicit in change-of-name
requirements compels us to look for alternative ways to serve relevant
state interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Present throughout this discussion of the right of married women
to retain their pre-marriage names is the assumption that names are a
matter of choice. Thus, I do not advocate that all women retain their
birth-given names when they marry. Some women, for convenience,
may want to adopt their husbands' surnames, which they may do through
a general common law change of name. However, for women who do
not wish to change their surnames, some procedure should be made
available. This could be accomplished most easily by a simple legisla-
tive statement of policy that a married woman may keep her maiden
surname. Of course, the legislature could prescribe specific procedures
for a woman to follow in indicating her choice. However, in those
states in which there has been no judicial decision requiring a change
of name upon marriage, no legislative action is necessary.115 Rather,
courts should adhere to the ancient presumption that a woman's name
114. Retaining one's name in marriage may also encourage each partner to develop
individually without relying on the other's reputation.
115. Legislation may be required in Alabama, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Illinois. See
Table in Appendix. However, the Attorney General of Hawaii has issued an opinion
that a married woman may change her name through statutory procedures. Letter
from Hawaii Attorney General to Lieutenant Governor George Ariyoski, June 6, 1973.
The Attorneys General of Pennsylvania and Virginia have expressed opinions that the
common law does not require a woman to change her name upon marriage. [1973]
PA. ATr'v GEN. Op. 62; Letter from Virginia Attorney General to Ms. Joan Mahan,
Secretary. State Board of Elections, June 6, 1973.
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is her birth-given name until she changes it. It should be a matter of
state administrative concern that a change of name made at any time
be properly recorded. This would dispose of the problems of fraud
and ease of identity at least as well as present practice, and would
properly place the burden on the person adopting a new name. Judi-
cial adherence to this presumption, and some relatively simple admin-
istrative procedures, will protect the interests of both state and indi-
vidual, an objective not yet accomplished:
With some notable exceptions, [judges] have failed to bring to sex
discrimination cases those judicial virtues of detachment, reflection and
critical analysis which have served them so well with respect to other
sensitive social issues . .. Judges have largely freed themselves from
patterns of thought that can be stigmatized as "racist". . . With
respect to sex discrimination, however, the story is different. "Sexism"
-the making of unjustified (or at least unsupported) assumptions about
individual capabilities, interests, goals and social roles solely on the
basis of sex differences-is as easily discernible in contemporary judicial
opinions as racism ever was.'1 6
116. Johnson & Knapp, supra note 83, at 676.
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